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Abstract—Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) consist of many 
sensors working as hosts. These sensors can sense a 
phenomenon and represent it in a form of data. There are many 
applications for WSNs such as object tracking and monitoring 
where the objects need protection. Providing an efficient 
location privacy solution would be challenging to achieve due to 
the exposed nature of the WSN. The communication protocol 
needs to provide location privacy measured by anonymity, 
observability, capture- likelihood and safety period. We extend 
this work to allow for countermeasures against semi-global and 
global adversaries. We present a network model that is 
protected against a sophisticated passive and active attacks 
using local, semi-global, and global adversaries.  
Keywords—WSN; anonymity; privacy; source location 
privacy; sink privacy; contextual privacy  
I. INTRODUCTION 
A wireless sensor is a simple autonomous host device. It 
can sense a phenomenon, convert the sensed information into 
data, process the data and then transmit the data to a sink for 
further analysis. The sensor host is very limited in terms of 
storage space, cache memory, computing power, 
communication bandwidth and battery energy [1]. This work 
focus on monitoring and tracking applications such as 
tracking animal in the wildlife or a fellow soldier in the field. 
When the sensor node senses an object, it reports data to the 
sink through other neighboring sensors. One of the most 
common applications discussed in literature is the panda 
monitoring game [1]. When a sensor node detects a Panda in 
a certain area, it should report it via a message to the sink. In 
order to protect the Panda from adversaries (ADVs), we need 
to implement in place an efficient source location privacy 
scheme (SLP). SLP is even more important in military, 
homeland security, and law enforcement, in addition to many 
civilian applications [2-4]. In addition, the network need to 
provide sink location privacy (SinkLP). 
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Privacy in WSN is typically categorized into two 
categories: data privacy and contextual privacy [5]. In this 
work, we shall focus on using anonymity to provide location 
privacy which includes SLP and SinkLP. There are many 
solutions which have been presented to solve the problems of 
SLP and SinkLP.  Recently, Anonymity has become a major 
concern for some WSN applications. We have identified 
important literature discussing solutions for anonymity in 
WSN such as, SAS, Simple Anonymity Scheme [6]; CAS, 
Cryptographic Anonymity Scheme [6]; HIR, Hashing-Based 
ID Randomization [7]; APR, Anonymous Path Routing [8]; 
DCARPS, Destination Controlled Anonymous Routing 
Protocol for Sensor Nets [2]. None of these solutions provide 
location privacy against active attacks and multiple colluding 
adversaries. An important solution against global adversary 
introduced by Chen et al. [9] called Efficient Anonymous 
Communication (EAC) which claims providing sender, link 
and sink anonymity. The solution is light, however, it can 
easily lose pseudonym synchronization. In addition, it fails to 
provide SinkLP and it is not secure against traffic rate analysis 
attack. We know that anonymity is not sufficient to provide 
end-to-end privacy. There are some solutions based on 
dummy (fake) data sources where sensors send out dummy 
packets to other nodes within the network. The rest of this 
paper is organized as follows: In section 3, we give some 
preliminaries for the system model, network model, threat 
model and the traffic model. In section 4, we will introduce 
our anonymity protocol. In section 5, we will provide security 
analysis and simulation. In section 6, we will summarize our 
work and suggest future work. 
III. PRELIMINARIES
We assume bi-directional links where two nodes are 
considered neighbors if they can hear each other [2].The 
network considers one sink which aggregates sensed data 
from all sensors. The sink works as an interface for WSN  to 
the wired network [6]. Data packets generated by the sensors 
are ultimately transferred uplink to the sink, however, it could 
go through a multi-hop route. Control packets can be sent 
from the sink, downlink, to the sensors by unicast or broadcast 
messages. To enhance SinkLP, the sink behaves like any other 
sensor in the network when it communicates with other 
sensors to make it absolutely indistinguishable. The WSN 
runs in three phases: deployment phase, icebreaker phase, and 
communication phase. We assume that sensors have the 
ability to obfuscate the addresses at the MAC level header [6]. 
The network adopts a time synchronization protocol [6]. The 
WSN will adopt a protocol for network topology discovery 
that allows the sink to view the global topology of the network 
without revealing its location [2]. The adversary nodes have 
much stronger power compared to the sensors. An adversary 
could run both passive and active attacks. We presume that 
only few compromised nodes can exist at one time due to the 1
implementation of intrusion detection system (IDS) [10]. We 
assume a global adversary which can monitor the traffic of the 
entire network and can determine the node responsible for the 
initial transmission. We also assume that the adversary is 
capable of observing sensors’ transmissions over extended 
periods of time. It is, however, not able to break the encryption 
algorithm or the hash functions adopted in the protocol.  
IV. PROPOSED ANONYMOUS MODEL
The communication process is divided into three phases, 
namely: deployment, icebreaker, and communication phases. 
A. Deployment phase: 
Prior to actual distribution of the sensors in the field of 
application, the sensors need to be tested, fully charged, and 
loaded with the parameters which are needed during the setup 
phase and then during the communication phase.  
B. Icebreaker phase 
In this phase, sensors get to know about their location and 
surroundings. Typically, WSN is considered secure for some 
short period of time after the deployment of sensors and 
before the steady communication phase. Zhu et al. [11] 
presented that WSN has Tmin, which is the shortest time that 
the adversary needs to be able to compromise a sensor. During 
this time, the sensors can communicate and exchange all 
needed information, such as preloaded parameters as well as 
some calculated parameters. The sink needs to know the 
location of all the sensors participating in the WSN. Likewise, 
the sensors need to know their relative locations to the sink 
and to the neighboring sensors. There are many localization 
schemes which are proposed in the literature [6].  After the 
localization process is completed, each sensor Si will know its 
hcisk, the smallest hop-count to the sink. All parameters 
and terms are listed in TABLE I. 
1) Creating Pseudonyms
A sensor needs to use one disposable ID per one transmission 
which means, the sensor uses any issued pseudonym only 
once. There are five kinds of transmissions that could happen 
during the communication phase: (i) multi- hop transmission 
to the sink, (ii) transmission between two neighbors, (iii) 
broadcast sent by Si or the sink, (iv) acknowledgement, and (v) dummy packet broadcast. The process starts by creating a 
pseudonym for each sensor Si, we call it for short (SIDi) which is computed using expression (1): 
SIDi = H(IDi  αi) (1) 
TABLE I. REFERENCE OF ALL PARAMETERS AND TERMS USED FOR THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK. 
Notation Definition 
αi Random number shared between Si & SINK 
βi Random number shared between Si & neighbors 
γi Random number shared between Si & neighbors 
H Hash function to create pseudonyms and the keys. 
kisk Pair-wise key shared between Si & SINK. 
kbi Broadcast key for Si. 
kdbi Dummy broadcast key for Si. 
Ni Number of neighboring for Si. 
hcisk Hop-count between Si & SINK. 
SIDi Pseudonym ID shared between Si & SINK. 
BSIDi Broadcast pseudonym ID. 
αij Random value shared between Si & Sj. 
kij Pair-wise key shared between Si & Sj. 
HSIDij Pseudonym ID shared between Si & Sj. 
ASIDi ACK pseudonym ID for Si. 
DSIDi Dummy broadcast pseudonym ID. 
Ti Table in Si for shared parameters. 
Si calculates the broadcast pseudonym ID (BSIDi) according to the following expression:  
BSIDi = H(IDi  βi) (2) 
Then, Si calculates the dummy broadcast pseudonym ID (DSIDi) according the following expression: 
DSIDi = H(IDi  γi) (3) 
Si should, by now, know its entire neighbors set Ni. A neighbor Sj is a sensor that could receive signal from the Si and vice versa through one-hop transmission. Si will send a broadcast discovery message (DISC), to exchange parameters 
with all one-hop neighbors as below: 
DISC = TTL || IDi || kisk || kbi || kdbi || αi  || βi || γi || hcisk  (4) 
Where TTL=1 for this transmission. Si will receive also a similar broadcast message from Sj and from all other neighbors. Both Si and Sj will calculate a new random value 
(αij) according to expressions below: 
αij = H(IDi  IDj) (5) 
Both Si and Sj will calculate also a new pair-wise key kij according to expression below: 
kij = H(kisk  kjsk) (6) 2
Si also calculates broadcast pseudonym ID for Sj (BSIDj) according to expression (2) since Si has already received the values of IDj and βj through DISC. It also calculates the one-
hop pseudonym ID (HSIDij) shared between Si and Sj as in the expression below: 
HSIDij = H(αi  αj) (7) 
Finally, acknowledgement pseudonym ID for Si (ASIDi) will be calculated according to the expression below: 
ASIDi =H(IDi) (8) 
Si will have a table Ti which contains the shared values with the neighbors as listed in TABLE II. Thus, we have replaced 
the ID with quintuple pseudonyms to reference the sensor 
during communication. 
2) Deleting security information
After storing all required pseudonyms, parameters and keys in 
Ti for Si, it would be the time to delete all unnecessary information for the purpose of security. In addition, it will 
release some memory storage space [9, 12]. Most importantly, 
Si will delete IDi and hcisk, which could be critical information for the adversary. In addition, Si shall delete discovery messages received earlier from the neighbors. 
C. Communication phase 
During the communication phase, when sending data to the 
sink takes place, there are seven operations that continue until 
the network dies. These operations are: sense and send a 
packet to a neighbor, forward a packet hop-by-hop, broadcast 
a real packet, acknowledgement, broadcast a dummy packet, 
a sensor cancelation, and a new sensor deployment. A sensor 
can have three roles, in terms of data transmission, during the 
communication phase:  
TABLE II. SHARED VALUES AMONG SENSOR NEIGHBORS. IF SI HAS NI 
NEIGHBORS, THEN TI WILL HAVE NI ROWS.   
Information in Ti per each neighbor Tuple for Sj 
Shared random number αij 
Shared broadcast random number βj 
Shared dummy random number γj 
Shared broadcast key BSIDj 
Shared dummy broadcast key DSIDj 
Shared one-hop key kij 
Current one-hop pseudonym ID HSID ij 
Link direction linkij 
Residual energy level j 
1) Sensing data
Si only recognizes itself by its newly calculated pseudonym (SIDi), and the sink can recognize source of the packet through SIDi identity as well. Thus, the SIDi of the source needs to be included in the packet until it reaches to the sink. 
Consequently, the SID of Si will be updated after every transmission. When data is sensed and ready to be sent along, 
Si needs to select one neighbor to forward the message to. The selection process goes through a probabilistic protocol which 
guarantees that Si does not depend all the time on one neighbor for routing privacy and for increasing the lifetime of 
the WSN. Si will form the message in the following format: 
Mij = HSIDij || Ekij (SIDi || Ekisk (Di)) || HMACkisk (SIDi || Di)  (9) 
Once Si knows that the packet (Mij) is delivered to the sink, it needs to dispose the current pseudonym SIDi and issue a new one for the next transmission as below: 
SIDi = H(SIDi  αi) (10) 
In addition, both Si and Sj will dispose the current HSIDij and issue a new one for the next communication between the two 
sensors as below: 
HSIDij = H(HSIDij  αij) (11) 
The packet M will then be reformatted by the recipient Sj and again forwarded to the next node, in the path, Sr and so on, until it gets to the sink. If Sj was the sink, then it uses the shared one-hop key between itself and the neighboring sensor, to decrypt the data and gets the SIDi which the it can use to recognize Si. Thus, the sink will be able to recognize the originator of this message. Only at this point of time, it can 
update the value of SIDi of Si. It also gets the data (Di) which 
it can read after decrypting it using kisk. 
2) Forwarding data
When Si sends the message one-hop uplink to the neighbor Sj, Sj needs to forward the message to another intermediary node. 
Upon receiving Mij, Sj will match HSIDij in its table, Tj. If there is no match, then the message will be dropped 
immediately. If it matches, then the message will be decrypt 
using kij. The message will be forwarded to Sr after M is reformatted as below: 
Mjr = HSIDjr || Ekjr (SIDi || Ekisk (Di)) || HMACkisk (SIDi || Di) (12) 
Right after the data is received by Sj and forwarded to the next 
one-hop Sr, the Sj updates both pseudonyms, HSIDij and 
HSIDjr. Sj now is ready to exchange another message with 
Si using the new pseudonym HSIDij. However, Sj is not yet 
ready to send data to Sr since Sr does not update the HSIDjr until Di is forwarded to the next hop, say NSv. 
3) Acknowledgement:
As expected in data networks, a packet could get lost or 
corrupted. In either case, retransmission is required. Because 
sensors change SIDs after each transmission, synchronizing 
SIDs is crucial. Updating the pseudonyms depends on 
successful message transmission and reception. Technically, 
a sender and a receiver, should alter the pseudonym value only 
after making sure the data was sent correctly and received 
perfectly by the sink.  The lack of direct connection between 
the sender and the receiver makes it a complicated process. Si needs to calculate acknowledgement pseudonym ID (ASIDi) according to the expression below: 
ASIDi = H(ASIDi   βi) (13) 
The message will be sent out now with the current value for 
ASIDi. Thus, we will rewrite Mij as it appears below: 
Mij = Pading || HSIDij || Ekij (ASIDi  || SIDi || Ekisk 
(Di)) || HMACkisk (SIDi || Di) (14) 3
Padding is added to make sure all the one-hop packets have 
the same size to prevent ADV from identifying the source by 
traffic analysis and size correlation attacks. When Sj receives the packet, it will reformat the packet as below and then send 
it to Sr: 
Mjr = ASIDi  || HSIDjr || Ejr (ASIDj  || SIDi || Ekisk 
(Di)) || HMACkisk (SIDi || Di)  (15) 
The transmission of Mjr should be heard by all the neighbors including both Si and Sr. If Si hears the message and reads 
ASIDi, the Si knows that Mij was received correctly by Sj. 
Only at this time Si updates the value of HSIDij. SIDi will get updated, as well, since Si is the source of the message. Here are two scenarios: 
Scenario 1: The packet sent by Si is lost or corrupted. In this case, Sj will not forward any message onward. Meanwhile, Si will wait for ω time to expire. It will send the message again 
with updated ASIDi. Once the message is acknowledged according to the procedure explained earlier, and if Si is the source, then SIDi, HSIDi and ASIDi will be updated. If it is intermediary sensor, only HSIDi and ASIDi get updated. 
Scenario 2: The packet is received correctly by Sj, the new 
packet Mjr is sent out including the acknowledgement 
ASIDi, and Sj updated the value of HSIDij. However, Si does 
not hear the forwarded message Mjr within time ω. At this moment Si does not know for sure if the packet was delivered, or the acknowledgement is lost. A copy of the message will 
be retransmitted to Sj with the current HSIDi and updated ASIDi. Sj can recognize the message because of the value of old HSIDi. After receiving the retransmitted packet, it now sends direct acknowledgement to Si as below: 
ACKij =  ASIDi  || Pading (16) 
Sink is treated similar to a normal sensor, so it has to 
acknowledge every packet it receives. After the packet is 
delivered to the sink, and after the message is acknowledged, 
the SIDi (of the source) will be updated. Both Si and the sink will be ready to exchange a new message. As long the new message does not reach the sink before the old SIDi gets updated, the system will continue to be synchronized. This 
way, we have a possible window of one message. However, 
there is no guarantee to have all messages arrive in order or 
within the window time. One way to do it is if the system 
accounts for minimum interval time min which is the minimum time span between two messages.  However, in 
some cases, the packet cannot be delivered at all through a 
certain route. One obvious scenario is when an intermediate 
node gets depleted out of energy before it forwards the 
message onward. The message needs to be rerouted through a 
different intermediate node which could cause a sever delay. 
We suggest to implement a sliding window mechanism as 
exhibited in Error! Reference source not found.. For each 
sensor, we can have a window of W size. If we have k bits for 
the sequence number of the SID, then we can have a sliding 
window of 2k-1 slots. That means the sink can receive up to 
W messages out of order. The window cannot slide ahead 
until the SIDs received earlier are all in order. We don’t need 
to create a sliding window in the sensor side because there is 
no direct acknowledgement coming from the sink. Once the 
sink finds out that the sequence of SIDs is not in sync, it will 
send a message to resynchronize itself with the sensor. 
4) Broadcasting data:
Typically, the sink is required to broadcast messages for 
control and management purposes. Likewise, a sensor might 
need to broadcast a message to the sink for network setup, 
maintenance and other management issues. A sensor could, as 
well, broadcast a message for emergency or urgency reasons 
depending on the application at hand. The framework requires 
keeping all the packets, transmitted throughout the network, 
indistinguishable. Thus, all the messages need to have similar 
size. Each sensor is preloaded with a broadcast key (kbi) and assigned broadcast pseudonym ID (BSIDi). The broadcast message sent by Si is formatted as in the expression below: 
B = Padding || BSIDi || Ekbi(Dbc) (17) 
The broadcast message from a source Si will be received by 
all the neighbors in Ni. Si and the recipients will update BSIDi according to the expression below: 
BSIDi = H(BSIDi  βi) (18) 
Upon receiving the broadcast message, Sj decrypts the message using the stored key (kbi) in the table Tj. It then encrypts it again using kbj and broadcasts the message to its one-hop neighbors set (Nj) as in expression below: 
B = BSIDi || BSIDj || Ekbj(Dbc) (19) 
Fig. 1. Sliding window for received SIDs. 
When the sink receives a broadcast message, it is ultimately 
the destination so intuitively it does not need to broadcast the 
message again. Our proposed framework assumes that the 
sink behaves like normal sensor. To maintain this requiremnt, 
we require the sink to broadcast the message again. Thus, we 
introduce the limited broadcast where the sink will broadcast 
only to one hop with TTL=1. Likewise, to reduce the 
unnecessary traffic, we have required the intermediary nodes 
to rebroadcast only to the neighbors with smaller hc in case 
of uplink messages, and to neighbors with bigger hc in case 
of downlink messages.  
5) Broadcasting dummy packets:
The sensors need to send dummy packets to prevent time 
correlation attack and statistical analysis. The rate of the 
dummy packets follow a certain protocol. Dummy message is 
a one-hop broadcast message. However, to prevent 4
correlation, the message needs to behave similar to real 
messages. So, the message needs to be encrypted and have 
similar size similar to other messages. This will make the 
dummy packets indistinguishable from the real packets. Since 
it has to carry a dummy data, we chose to make it carry 
residual energy () of the source sensor. This information will 
be extracted by the recipient neighbors and saved in the 
related tuple in the table T.  The dummy broadcast message 
sent by Si is explained in the expression below: 
Mdummy = Padding || DSIDi || Ekfi(i) (20) 
The dummy broadcast message from Si will be received by all the neighbors in Ni. Si and the recipients will then update DSIDi according to the expression below:   
DSIDi = H(DSIDi  γi) (21) 
There is no need to worry about the pseudonym 
synchronization since the main purpose of dummy message is 
to show activity in idle sensors to obfuscate real messages. 
D. Sensor cancelation and addition 
If Si needs to be canceled from WSN, it sends two messages requesting cancelation. The first message is to the sink as 
below:  
Mij = HSIDij || Ekij (SIDi || Ekibs (Dcancel)) (22) 
The tuple of the Si in the sink tables will be removed. The Si will also send a broadcast message to the neighbors according 
to the expression below: 
Mbc = Padding || BSIDi || Ekbi(Dcancel) (23) 
Once the neighbors get the message Dcancel, they will delete the tuple related to Si from the tables. To add Si to the network, it will be preloaded with all setup parameters: IDu, αu, βu, γu, 
H, kusk and kbu, and kdbu. Right after deployment, Si calculates the shared parameters with its neighbors. Before 
sharing the calculated parameters with the Si, the neighbors authenticate the new sensor. The sink will send authentication 
key kadd to all sensors. Si will be preloaded with the same key as well. Si and the neighbors will use the key to authenticate with each other. Initially, the sink sends the following 
message to all of its one-hop neighbors as below: 
B = Padding || BSIDsk || Ekb-sk(Dadd) (24) 
Where Dadd is expressed below: 
Dadd = hc || kadd (25) 
The initial value for hc is 0 where it represents the hop count. 
It will be incremented every time the message is forwarded.  
V. SIMULATION AND SECURITY ANALYSIS 
We need to analyze our solution for both passive and 
active adversary attacks. Sensors use pseudonyms to identify 
each other instead of using real IDs. The real ID’s are not 
stored in the sensors and each pseudonym is used only once.  
Sensed data in the packets is encrypted all the way from the 
source to the destination. For eavesdropping and content 
analysis, ADV can intercept messages without being able to 
analyze them because data is encrypted. The only information 
the adversary can get of the captured packet is the 
pseudonyms: HSID, BSID or DSID which are all temporary 
and have no use except to calculate new pseudonyms. 
However, the adversary cannot get important parameters αij, βi or γi which are required to calculated new pseudonyms. For 
hop-by-hop trace, the adversary can track stream of messages 
from one node to another by overhearing transmitted data. The 
ADV will be faced with many real and dummy identical 
transmissions throughout the space and lifetime of the 
network. Furthermore, each node would retransmit through 
different routes and the message changes entirely after each 
transmission. For size correlation, ADV will not be able to 
understand relationship between incoming and outgoing 
packets by analyzing message sizes since all the messages 
have commensurate size. For identity correlation, ADV 
cannot relate overheard identities to sensors since they use 
different pseudonyms every time a message is transmitted. 
For rate monitoring, ADV tries to find different transmission 
rates in the network such as having higher transmission rate 
nearby the BS spatial location or at particular periods of time. 
This is handled by issuing dummy messages all over the 
network to maintain similar transmission rate chronically and 
spatially. If ADV compromises Si physically, then it captures two sets of information: information related to the node and 
information related to the neighbors. The ADV would have all 
it needs to issue pseudonyms and send messages out to 
neighbors. Let’s look closely at few scenarios. 
Scenario 1: If the adversary physically compromises Si, and 
if Sj and Sr ∈ Ni, so Si knows some information about both Sj 
and Sr. However, it cannot reproduce important information 
such as ajr which is required for one-hop communication 
between Sj and Sr [9] because Si would need IDj and IDr which 
are both deleted of the sensors. If Si hears a message, it cannot 
determine, with high confidence, the sender among neighbors 
while communicating with each other. If Si receives message 
from sources ∉	Ni, then it would not be able to determine the 
source. 
Scenario 2: If the adversary physically compromises multiple 
sensors, let’s call it set CS, and collects number of messages, 
let’s call it set CM. Then, the number of compromised SIDs 
equal to CM since each message has unique SID. If the source 
Si ∉ CS, then ADV cannot know the source sensor [13]. 
Scenario 3: If the message sent by source Si as in scenario 2 
passes thought Sj ∈ CS or even through multiple compromised 
sensors, it will not be able to correlate the captured SIDi to Si.  
Scenario 4: If a message sent by source Si and ∀ S ∈ Ni is also 
∈ CS (all neighbors are compromised), then the adversary will 
be able to know that Si is the source. It is unrealistic situation 
to have many compromised nodes in one area. However, this 
proves that few compromised sensors cannot locate the 
identity of the source. In addition, a compromised sensor does 
not actually need to locate the sources within its range since it 
can detect the objects of interest (Panda) knowing that 
ultimate goal is to capture the object not the sensor reporting 
the object.  
SLP and SinkLP are achieved at first by having successful 
source, link and sink anonymity which was explained earlier. 5
The adversary cannot learn any information from the 
intercepted packets. Passive attacks will not endanger the 
location privacy. However, severe active attacks could hinder 
the location privacy if the WSN does not have IDS. By using 
dummy messages at variable interval times, it becomes hard 
for the adversary to correlated messages being transmitted 
over the network. Although shortest path routing is used in 
this framework, selecting the next hop is done according to a 
probabilistic algorithm which accounts for the residual energy 
levels and usage frequency to increase the routing privacy. 
The adversary cannot relate routes to sensors. Even if two 
messages follow the same route, the adversary will see them 
as if they are two different routes since each node along the 
route has different SIDs. The location safety period which is 
the period between capturing the first packet and finding out 
the location of the source or the sink. It is measured as the 
ratio between the period of discovering the location and the 
interval period [25]. We have implemented a WSN of 300 
sensor nodes uniformly distributed over 200 x 200 area. Fig. 
2 shows that E2AC provides better source safety period. Fig. 
3 shows that E2AC also provides better sink safety period. 
However, the source safety period is much more than the sink 
safety period in both schemes. It is always harder to achieve 
SinkLP due to the volume of transmissions nearby the sink.  
Fig. 2. Source Safety Period 
Fig. 3. Sink Safety Period 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Our solution provides source, link and sink anonymity, SLP 
and SinkLP. This work addressed local and global adversary 
network view. It handles both passive and active attack 
models. Anonymity cannot provide temporal privacy. To 
provide temporal privacy, dummy messages were introduced. 
We showed how our solution improved safety period for both 
SLP and SinkLP. The future work would include 
enhancement on the probabilistic scheme for dummy 
messages usage. It also will account for using dummy packets 
to provide efficient power consumption. 
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